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The child in search of his identity and origins¹

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The child has the right to a name, a family and an education. This may be perceived as obvious. But in the reality lived by the children, the obviousness fades, and the most multiple problems emerge. There are those that the children abandoned in the street live, or those of the children adopted under the promise to keep secret the identity of the natural parents, or of the children born in the occasion of a birth "under X" (anonymity of the mother), etc.

Should we reveal to the child the secret of his origins, or the mystery that surrounds them? Do we side with "popular wisdom" when it affirms that "speech is silver and silence is golden", or do we side with Bertolt Brecht when he affirms that "he who does not know is an ignoramus, he who knows and keeps silent is a malefactor"?

If we postulate that knowledge about origins is a right, is it useful, is it necessary, especially in the evolution of the continuity and unity of the child's personality? What is the relationship between this right to original knowledge and cognitive and affective skills? Are the disclosures conditioned by the "capacity of discernment" of oneself, of relationships, of situations, of which the legislators speak to us? In other words, is there a minimal threshold or sensitive phases to inform the child, to make revelations on his origins?

Should the child be informed that the name he bears is not that of his parents? How to make him know the secrets of his birth, the mysteries of his family, the tribulations of an unorthodox parental couple, the absence of a father, the presence of a cohabitant or the existence of extra lovers?

What are the respective consequences of the revelation, the conspiracy of silence, or the pious lie?

The questions are often early, will the answers be the same? Should we tell everything, or proportion the information according to the question?

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By asking questions in this way, are we not already implying the answers that we think we are proposing?

But, apart from these educational concerns, what does psychology tell us about the function and role of knowledge in the development of identity?

Preliminary remarks on the Convention on the Rights of the Child

When we define a new status and new rights for the child, we de facto question the representation we had of the status of the adult or of his rights. For example, the defense of children abused or violated by one or other of their parents implies considering certain private behaviors as a "public matter". The expression of the rights of the child inevitably also leads to a revision of the notion of duties applicable to children. In the Convention, the notion of duty is associated with age, with "maturity", with "capacity of discernment". What about this capacity?

To discern is to be able to separate, recognize and differentiate. How then can we determine the threshold of maturity and discernment below which the child is perceived as fragile, in need of protection, and not very capable of discernment, and above which he or she is responsible, capable of giving his or her opinion and acting with discernment? Will we reactivate the notion of age of reason, and propose to place the first threshold of "minority/majority" at 7 years old, or earlier? Who will be asked to decide? Cognitive, affective and relationship psychologists?

The legislator could be wrongly accused of not being discerning in confusing the adult-child categories. We have seen in the recent past how the discussion on the equality of sexes has provoked the emergence of theories advocating androgyny (S.Bem, 1974, see M.C. Hurtig and M.F.Pichevin, 1986) or the indifferentiation of sexes (E. Badinter, 1986), as a means of overcoming the inequality between men and women, and here we are confronted with an inevitable contradiction: to operate a dedifferentiation in order to allow the emergence of a true equality. But the real progress passes, not by the negation of the inter-category differences, but by the accentuation of the primacy of a superior category which includes them all: that of human identity, that of "person", allowing to avoid the collusion between the differences and the relations of domination

(Tap,1985, Lorenzi-Cioldi,1988). However, the child, even the baby, must be considered as persons, in the same way as adults, whatever the level and nature of their competence and their differences.

During the present colloquium, J.P. Rosenzweig affirmed that "the law is only a mirror of our contradictions". This statement, which I share, has two consequences for research:

- the analysis of the history of the law on children and families should allow us to better understand the issues at stake through the contradictions that have been brought to light;
- The analysis of the history of identity conflicts and the difficulty of identifying origins should take into account the problem of discernment and responsibility. This problem is indeed related to the history of subjectivation. Now "(the subject) is a possibility (abstract) but not a fatality for every human being: it is a historical creation and a creation whose history can be followed. This subject, the human subjectivity, is characterized by reflexivity and by the will or capacity of deliberate action" (Castoriadis, 1986). Such a position (taken by a counter-current psychoanalyst) implies both the rejection of the existence of a process without a subject (Levi-Strauss, Althusser, Foucault) or that of a subject resorbed in the social individual, and in particular in language (Lacan, Barthes, Derrida). The analysis of the relationship between the genesis of personal identity and the quest for origins is therefore fundamental.

The origin as a blind spot, an anchor and an identity spring

Knowing one's origins for the child, as for any human being, is a necessity in the construction of one's own identity, by the appropriation of a name, of a double filiation, (maternal and paternal genealogical branches) and by the rooting, the anchoring in two intertwined family histories, one of which is often dominant.

But the child, by being part of these stories, finds a place in situations, contexts, changes and perspectives which, through his family, engage him very early in a complex process of social and cultural integration and/or marginalization.

In his "normal" development, the child, as soon as his language skills allow it, asks questions about his own origins, as well as about the

origins of humanity and society. Thereafter, the question of personal origins will only really come up if doubts or revelations call into question the foundations of his genealogy or the representation he may have had of the identity of his parents and the conditions of their relationship.

Every child should be able to build a personal identity and a temporal horizon based on continuity and coherence, thanks to identificatory supports, to roots in a history and collective identities. In the security of these anchors, the child will be able to build an itinerary, to produce and to realize himself, (Tap, 1988).

Conversely, silences, inexplicable or unexplained situations, secrets, inauthenticity of communications, can seriously disturb the process of identification, create depreciation, uncertainty, anguish of being. The child can establish pathological regressions, the adolescent can engage in self-destructive or asocial practices.

However, we should not dramatize the types of situations mentioned above. Multiple strategies of recovery, compensation and substitution are put in place by the individuals considered, from their childhood and afterwards.

This quest for origins is not cut off from the quest for the future (anticipations, aspirations, projects). Moreover, revelations and elucidations can occur at any time in adult life. They can, depending on the case, be the result of a voluntary quest, or the forced consequence of unexpected external information. The relationship between identity and origins is often closer in a crisis situation, even if it can also be organized in the mode of an exalting initiation rite.

Discernment: a struggle against categorical uniformity

On the occasion of her radio program, Françoise Molto receives a letter from a teacher. At the beginning of her career, she had started as a substitute teacher in a kindergarten. The headmistress said to her, "You see, there are lockers; in the evening the children put away their bears and buckets, like this: one locker per child, one bear and one bucket per locker. The evening comes, the children have a prodigious sense of smell; they must have smelled something. I ask them to go and put their things away: they put all the bears on one side, by

two, and all the buckets of the other. I intervene: "This is not how you usually tidy up". They answer me: "But it is because they are bored (the teddy bears)". The teacher tells this to the Director who looks at her with concern and makes her put everything back "as it should be".

Françoise Dolto then discusses: "It is to be together that we go to school, it is not to be in a locker". "Separate yourselves. Do not communicate"... Even bears should not communicate (Dolto, 1978).

We see the danger of reducing the rational to the division into pigeonholes, into categories. We often behave like the Director for whom children are equal in law and are treated in uniformity and conformity to the rules. Equal rights are thus limited by rigid categorizations. Yet, do children not have the right to imagine, to communicate, to structure their own space of free movement? What order is imposed on them, and in the name of what legitimacy? Doesn't the question also arise for adults?

Let's take the example of the differentiation between public space and private space or place of intimacy. There is what one can say and do in public, according to certain limits; and then there is what one can say and do in intimacy (a bored teddy bear or one who wants to communicate). However, we have seen that the law is evolving in the direction of questioning this division (abused women or children, incestuous practices...).

Defending the (individual) person forces one to question the standardizing and stigmatizing boxes. It is necessary to limit group and categorical pressures in order to allow the child to manage a personal space, to separate, to discern, but in interaction (external or internal with others).

Personal identity is often considered either as the result of the internalization of social belonging and the summation of social identities, or, on the contrary, as what the subject opposes to these collective identities, and which would constitute his singularity. These two positions seem to me contestable. The subject is neither the reflection of the society (socialization and personalization are joint but not confused, the individual confirmation is not reduced to the conformity) nor an a-social reference (the originality does not imply an automatic marginalization).

In reality, the relationship between socialization (insertion into a network, appropriation of social and cultural data) and personalization (autonomy, singularization, critical thinking, orientation, self-realization) implies a conflictual dynamic through which the child identifies and opposes, at the same time or successively, social incentives and pressures.

We have seen above that the child needs communication, warmth. But he also needs "intimate" spaces.

In one of her programs Françoise Dolto (1978) evoked the idea that children should have a personal piece of furniture, locked with a padlock. A mother wrote to her: "Wouldn't it be better to teach children to respect the other's corner while knowing that this corner is accessible? Dolto answers: "It is ideal. But children envy each other. There are children who are really persecuted by brothers and sisters. They will be able to put away precious things, a hiding place also with respect to grown-ups, their little treasures, their diary.."

It is still a question here, but within the family this time, of defending a space of freedom and decision, of defending the privacy of the child. Of course, the strategies of expansion and withdrawal interact in the same way as your singularity and conformity. Of course, parents give themselves, or not, the possibility of expansion or withdrawal. Do they give themselves the right to exist outside of their children? Do they have places of reserved access: their bedroom, their office, a locker?

We can clearly see here how the question of the rights of the child and the adult leads to that of the emergence of spaces of free movement, of construction of an "interiority", in situation of inter-relation and inter-structuring between the adult and the child.

The work of the name and surname: filiation and individualization

My identity makes sense through the marks I wear, through what bears my mark. It crystallizes in the traces of my origins, the history of my stigmas, the legitimacy and power of my referents. The feeling of identity and the continuity of the self imply the emergence of a memory of the self, of a management of the marks and traces of the past, according to the present actions and the future projects.

My body is already marked by my origins: my skin color, my stature.

my accent, my way of speaking or behaving, of dreaming or believing. Of course, not everything I have become is inscribed in my origins, even if they determine and orient me.

Among the traces, there are what Levi-Strauss calls the "recognizable marks of identification" from which society situates us. For example, the national identity card limits our "civil status" to our name and surname, the date and place of our birth, our domicile. Our body identity is reduced to our face (photographed) and our height! The heading "particular sign" is almost always blank, except for those who wear glasses!

The child is also, from birth, socially "identified", before being able to build and manage his own image.

The patronymic name assigns to the child a place, a position, in the game of the double filiation. This assignment will be initially verbal: to be called by its name, it is to be perceived, located, convened: "Such a one, leave the row... a step forward! The name is an appellation, that is to say a public presentation. Let us remember the scene where Charles Bovary, character of Flaubert, arriving in a new class, is invited to introduce himself and answers "Char...Bovary", provoking hilarity and hullabaloo! The name is also a spelling, ~~that~~ to say, a deconstruction of oneself. The one who has to spell his name is told of the strangeness of an unpronounceable name.

"I don't have a French name. I don't have a French name. No reason to cut me up, to mutilate me. You only have to read... Just check the spelling...Doubrovsky. Only ten letters. Please respect. When I'm spelled backwards, it turns me inside out. When I am crippled, it hurts me. My name has cost me enough. It has made me drool. I want to keep it. Name to lay outside, I am cut. My stumps are being amputated as best they can" (Doubrovsky, 1977).

But the child is confronted with the need to assume what his filiation implies in social and cultural terms, in a mesh between individual and collective history.

In his book *Fils*, Serge Doubrovsky shows the necessity of *tying up the threads* of one's own weave in order to build a personal history and a personal aim. But nothing is woven without drama, and this drama is often associated with the *difficulties of being a son* and of managing one's filiation. For example, he evokes, in autobiographical terms, the need to learn to assume one's (Jewish) origins and one's history, while refusing the stigmatization that it may have caused.

involve.

"Lack of skin, at the glans (circumcision), lack of pot, at the camp. Narrowly escaped. The old humiliations. Police. Pants down. Under-vitamed, under-man ... December 41, had to stamp the cards. Identity, in red ink. Police station. Shrug of the shoulder. A name to sleep outside. Where do I come from? I was tattooed!... In the flesh remained. The mark will always remain. Ineffaceable. A stigma. The yellow star. (Saved from Drancy in Nov.43, thanks to an agent who came to warn them). "Go quickly"... Paletots without stars put on, we left. Rats you're, we deracinate. Roundups, we rake.. "Forbidden to Jews and dogs" (*op.cit.*). One inherits a name and all that goes with it.

We look for our origins when we lack them, but we can have difficulties to assume them when we know them.

In any case, the right to a name is essential, but it is not enough to have a name, one must be and/or become a name. "To make a name" implies a social visibilization in terms of celebrity. But the process concerns all the individuals, beyond the legal and social characteristics: the personal identity is built, among other things, by the setting in report of a me (body and psychic) and of a name: word which defines it. But

"It is not enough to be a name. It is necessary to be a presence", (Doubrovsky, *op.cit.*, p.355).

But the work of the name is constantly articulated to that of the first name. As Rémy Puyuelo (1989) indicates, having a first name for the child implies the access to the singularity by the separation. The first name is like the private name, "our only proper name". To have several first names allows most often to maintain bonds between the generations. But the unique first name can also bring back to bastard filiation or forbidden. One will judge it in the literary example of Thomas, hero of *The bird of the origins*, (Max Gallo, 1974)

Thomas does not know the story of his birth. He lives with his father (who is ill, considered crazy by the people outside, and who always reads and writes, but never speaks), his aunt and his sister. He doesn't know who his mother is, and thinks she is dead. But one day, he reads the diary written by his father (The Great Reader). He is convinced that it is his mother and tries to lift the veil on the secret of her birth,

to free himself from his anxieties, his asthma and his allergies (which he personifies under the features of a "bird of the origins" or as "forces which tear us like sharp beaks"). Like his father, Thomas decides that later he will write. Unable to get any information from those he calls "the hypocritical guardians of secrecy", he will have to find the path to the truth alone. He lives with difficulty the crisis of his own identity. His solitude makes him mute (like his father), and like him he asks himself a single question "Man, who are you?"

The quest for his origins leads to a revelation he did not expect. Eva is his mother, but the "Great Reader" is not his father. While he was a prisoner of war, Eva conceived Thomas, the son of another man, also named Thomas. The first name thus becomes the mark of hidden paternity.

Emmanuelle, Thomas's sister, dies before she can tell him about the end of Eva. But, as a single mother, she leaves him her son, of unknown father, also named Thomas. Thus, hidden threads are tied up, or untied, thanks to the mysterious filiation of the Thomases.

Name, first name(s), nicknames and diminutives organize and orient the modalities of communication, the links, the public (formal and spectacular) or private (specular, fusional or distanced) staging. By making a "name-name", the child or the teenager, can "free himself from the family repressed, from this dangerous part which would make that his life, in a repetition with the similar one, would be only destiny" (R.Puyuelo, *op.cit.*), and to build an itinerary, insecure but specific and exalting.

The price of revelation

Etymologically, the term "revelation", often used, implies the idea that what is to be revealed has been previously hidden under a veil. Revelation is therefore the unveiling of a secret. But why this secret? Two reasons are often given to justify it: adults hide the truth because it would cause scandal, give them or the family a depreciated image. Or they want to protect the child, to avoid the suffering that the revelation could cause.

It should not be assumed that a disclosure has no effect on the person concerned (child or adult).

Let's take the example of Myriam (Pi-Sunyer, 1987), a 15-year-old girl of Gypsy origin. She was raised by her grandmother, who let her and the whole family believe that she was her mother. Her uncle Didier and her real mother (Carmen) passed for her brother and sister. It is her uncle Didier who will teach her the truth, under the following circumstances:

"One day I was talking with my brother (uncle) Didier. We were arguing, he hit me and said: "Go see your mother... your mother is Carmen! I immediately understood that it was true. I went to a friend's house and stayed there for a week. I was thirteen years old. Until then I was a good girl. But from that moment on everything changed. I ran away for the first time. I wanted to kill myself. Carmen, she was my favorite sister... I knew right away that it was true, even though I had never thought, not at all, that she was my mother.

I became mean, I would fight with anyone. I changed completely. I was at the top of the class. I completely sank... I wanted to leave... Carmen is a bitch. She is mean. She never wanted me and if my grandmother wouldn't have taken me, she would have given me away.

Carmen was 15 years old when she was expecting Myriam. But, at 15, Myriam is pregnant, in her turn. She gives birth to Anthony. Carmen offers her to raise the child. The rehearsal is in place. But Myriam will refuse. She will go to live, in spite of the educators' advice, at her grandmother's, whom she continues to consider as her mother. She wants to continue to call her that.

The revelation in fact provokes the observation of a lack and the establishment of a new mystery. If his grandfather is not his father, who is his father?

Let's take another example, this time literary. In Jacques Lanzmann's *"All roads lead to oneself"* (1979), the hero André Floch is convinced, through a series of coincidences, that his recently deceased parents were only adopted, and that he is, in fact, Samuel Bronstein, whose Jewish parents died in the deportation. "(He bought the house where the Bronsteins lived, not far from the maternity hospital where he and Samuel Bronstein were born). Is it possible that I, André Floch, am the Bronsteins' own son? Is it possible to be Jewish without knowing it? He would be of the Jewish 'type', he

would resemble Simon Bronstein, Samuel's father, he would be circumcised. But on this point the Jewish doctor who examines his incision remains undecided and circumspect. He does not decide between the hypothesis of surgical circumcision (following a phimosis) and ritual circumcision. He warns him against the effects of the revelation: "Learning that you are Jewish at 36 years old, that can hurt, sir, it can even hurt a lot. Cancer is sometimes curable; such a revelation might not be" (op. cit., p. 124). The hero then starts to "search the History in general to find himself in his own". When his conviction is made, he does not know any more to which identity to devote himself, "not feeling ready, not ready at all to assume another identity". "I had simply switched from one people to another".

He is emotionally destabilized. "My throat suddenly opened and tears followed, flooding my mind. I was cracking, it was undeniable, and from everywhere, escaping from myself, not knowing if I would find myself again, not knowing if I would have the strength to accept the other."

To tell the truth, he had been doubting for a long time, "I had begun to pursue a certainty that I had been brooding over since childhood and even to go beyond it. I had always had the conviction that my mother was not my mother in spite of the tenderness with which she had surrounded me". "By dint of fabricating differences and dissimilarities, by dint of refusing to let my face be part of their landscape, I had succeeded in persuading myself that my parents had themselves broken the family mirror, so that one could no longer reflect oneself in it.

He tracks down the truth, which will not be the one he expected and feared at the same time. He is indeed André Floch, and he will have the opportunity to meet the real Samuel, his "brother of course", his "twin of the imagination". He joins Juliette, his cousin who loves him and wanted to belong to him, but who, reactionary and racist, could not accept him as a Jew. It was "an intoxication of all the moments, a need to stun me, a way to assassinate forever the other and to avoid that it does not wake up in case it would still sleep in me. I had the feeling that the other was dead, fallen under the blows of truth and logic combined".

In the real example of Myriam and the literary one of André Floch, the revelation (true or false) about the origins intervenes late and provokes an identity crisis.

If we know it, should we tell the truth to the child very early on, to avoid serious problems

later on? I think, with Françoise Dolto, that the truth should never be hidden. Very young children need to know, but we must wait for their questions. "As soon as the child asks the question, we must answer him with the truth. His confidence in himself and in his parents depends on it... Each time this truth will be progressively said with words that become more and more conscious for the child" (Dolto, 1977).

But it is important to specify immediately that what one says to the child takes on a different meaning according to the context of the relationship that one establishes with him. The word on the origins cannot make the economy of the emotional and erotic character of these same origins.

The staging of the origins and its troubles

Informing the child about his origins is not only knowing his father and mother, it is also explaining to him how man and woman are constituted, how he himself was conceived and how he was born.

We know how much importance psychoanalysts attach to the role of the "primitive or original scene" in the organization of the sexual imagination of the child. The child would try to represent mentally the moment when it was conceived. But this implies having an image of the coitus between the parents, and explains the voyeuristic desire to surprise the parents during their sexual frolics. Or, "to attend the sexual intercourse of one's parents would be traumatic, because the genitility of a human being is built in the modesty, the respect of others and the chastity of the adults with regard to the children... No incestuous practical work with the complicity of the parents. It is traumatic" (Dolto, 1977, p.82).

Here is a significant example from a life story presented by Abdelhak Serhane (1989). Saida, a Moroccan woman living in her own country, is 25 years old and the eldest of a modest family with four children. She tells of her difficulties with her father, who cannot console himself for not having had a boy as his first born, and who makes Saida pay for his frustration. "I grew up under his hateful gaze". She says: "Even as a young girl, I could see my parents' lovemaking. We lived in a single room and my bed was perpendicular to theirs. For me, the sexual act was always an act of aggression. I could often see my father's body clearly on top of my mother and I felt as if he was trying to smother her. I didn't understand at the time what they

I was surprised the next day when I saw that my mother was still alive. Then I started to believe that it was a game that only they knew the rules of. I thought, "Mom and Dad are playing. It was innocent. But I didn't dare ask questions. It was unthinkable. Before, everything was quiet, except for a few grumbles. One day, I heard my father cursing my mother. I would later understand that my mother didn't want to play this game anymore when the father wanted to. The game became a real drama for me. I hated the night. Every night, the father would call my mother names, sometimes beat her, and threaten her to leave or take another woman. I was only relieved when daylight came. Often, to escape the scandal, I had to take my blanket and go sleep at the neighbors'.

Without information, without reassuring and enlightening words, the child is forced to interpret from day to day (or rather from night to night!), in anguish, in the unspeakable and the implicit.

In the case of Dominique presented by Dolto (1971), it is assumed that the vision of parental coitus can provoke later disorders. Dominique, an adolescent, has "a phobia of being heard and hearing, of being looked at and seeing, of being taken and bitten. These phobias are undoubtedly related to the primitive scene seen and experienced. He slept in his crib in his parents' room until he was two and a half years old". But it is the birth of his sister Sylvie which provokes the crisis (phobias of movements, arrangement...). The jealousy causes a conflict of identity. He is not any more the preferred one, the protected. He identifies himself then with the infant: not speaking, not feeding any more, incontinent.

His parents' current behavior: a father who is always absent and a mother who needs to sleep with her children "who keep her warm" (calorific fetishes, in short!) have reinforced the old troubles linked to Sylvie's birth. Dominique, in these conditions, cannot internalize the prohibition of incest.

"The elucidation of the conditions of the birth and the distancing from the parents, in the imagination as well as in reality, can take a long time. It is often during adolescence or adulthood that certain secrets and disorders are unraveled. It is the adult who creates the secret for his own security or in the name of a pseudo-fragility of the child. "It is necessary to deliver the truth to the child: the meaning of his life is rooted in it", and this before the school age. "The absence of explanation on the origins always hinders, sooner or later, the intelligence of the language, the affective life and the social life".

In order to move forward, Dominique will have to rediscover the meaning of his regressive behaviors, to restore his name by appropriating the incestuous ban. This will allow him to renounce his imaginary infantile aims and to structure new relationships with all the members of the family. If the release becomes complete, the child can focus on others his desire, with the feeling of freedom, towards success, accomplishment in the pleasure of reaching a goal, to lead a conscious and autonomous existence, without too much defensive tension.

Identifications and duplications

The history of personal identity is like the double helix, braiding together two spirals

- that of identifications and filiations to be unraveled: the threads to be designated, to be assigned, to be enthroned, to be freed;
- and that of the itineraries, of the threads to be tied in order to build a more or less unified future, in relation to others.

In a word then, continuity of the identity filiation and unity of the weaving of the self, in their relationship with the projects and the idealizations. For example Serge Doubrovsky identifies himself with his mother and yet refuses to do so and would like to acquire his autonomy

"Inside we are made the same. Envelopes are different. Same cores... We are one-in-two. Two bodies, one heart. The same being. In double. The original. The carbon paper. Original, it is her, the origin. Can't be me if I don't go through her. My image is refracted in her, reverberates. I grow a hundredfold, I am giant... but I want to be the opposite of her. I will never sacrifice myself to anyone. I will be free. Who goes hunting loses his place. I am resolved to make me one..." ... but search of an identity always stolen from a me always deported.

But Julien-Serge Doubrovsky lives a constant internal split which is symbolized by the conflict of his two first names: "I was Julien... my name is Serge. Julien for the family, Serge as a pen name. Julien/Serge, bad household...Julien/Serge, I toasted. They made me drool. Dog and cat, in the same skin. Sewn together. To separate them, impossible. I always suffocate between the two. Between me and me, even if I put America between, not a crack. Can't slip between me and a gap. I am

crossed by contrary currents... (I) only make indecisions. I think therefore I flee.. But I won't die like that. I want to leave traces, that one follows my track, even if one refuses my way.

If you are one, you mutilate yourself. To be multiple, we disperse ourselves. To be whole, you have to want to be what you lack, as well as what you are. When you lead a double life. While one has a half, one does not have the other. One is deprived of it" (1977).

How to better express the general process of identization involving simultaneously identification and opposition to others, as well as effort of continuity, unity and positivity of oneself, constantly contradicted by indecision and internal division! This process is early and finds its movement in the intertwining of origins and becoming, constantly actualized in the present act.

The statutes and rights of the child must facilitate this story of identization. But this does not mean in any way that it stops at any moment of life. The subject can, at all the periods of its life, unload infantile strategies to the profit of others better in connection with the autonomy and the *implementation* of the potentialities and with the norm of internality (responsibility, discernment) implied in the right.

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